Mind and World:

Beyond the Externalism/Internalism Debate

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Background

For the last few years the concept of the natural kind terms has haunted me. My main concern has been regarding the location of the meaning of these terms. Are meanings of the natural kind terms in the head or in the world? This question has been the most pressing in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Language. I have realized that we cannot separate mind from the world. I had in the beginning only a layman's conception regarding mind, meaning and the world. When I entered the field of philosophy inspired by Hilary Putnam, I found that semantic externalism is a vexing issue involving a vast area.

The location of content is at the core of the metaphysical debate regarding internalism and externalism in the sense that internalists believe that mental proprieties are intrinsic only if they preserve across world identity of internal replicas. Externalism is opposed to this thinking. For externalists, mental properties are in many cases dependent on physical or social environment. The linguistic strategy also maintains a difference between internalism and externalism regarding the mental content. Descriptivism focuses on general terms that consist in descriptive content and leads to mode of presentation of reference through sense. Besides, the causal theory of reference refutes descriptivism to ensure that there is a causal chain of reference between words and

objects that help us to identify agent's thought through an identification of its relation with external environment.

I would like to discuss on Frege and Russell's descriptivism that is a preliminary platform from where the debate between internalism and externalism has picked up. It is difficult to decide whether Frege was an internalist or an externalist. It seems to me that Frege's theory of reference can be found to be regarding the relation between language and world while his theory of sense is regarding the relation between language and mind. Hence we find that Fregeans amongst externalists (like Gareth Evans) emphasize on Frege's theory of reference, while Fregeans amongst internalists (like Gabriel Segal) emphasize on Frege's theory of sense. So these recent orthodoxies, i.e. internalism and externalism both have a Fregean root. As an internalist Searle claims that 'Both the Fregean and the present account of meaning are internalist in the sense that it is in virtue of some mental state in the head of a speaker and hearer – the mental state of grasping an abstract entity or simply having a certain intentional content – that speaker and hearer can understand linguistic references.'[1] But Putnam considers Frege to be an externalist. In his paper "Meaning and Reference", he claims that 'Frege, however, rebelled against this 'psychologism'. Feeling that meanings are public property - that the same meaning can be 'grasped' by more than one person and by one person at different times.'[2]

Kripke probably first claimed that the reference of proper names and natural kind terms are determined by causal chains. Hilary Putnam extended this causal theory of reference of proper names to natural kind terms. Putnam, however, does not give importance to the Kripkean idea of *Baptism*. Putnam actually gives more importance to the question of how the user of the word would explain its meaning. He thinks that we cannot define a natural kind term (like 'tiger') by merely conjoining some 'defining characteristic' like, striped, four legged, carnivorous etc. This is so because a natural kind may have some abnormal members. For instance, a three legged tiger is still a tiger. In *My Intellectual Autobiography*, Putnam says that 'On the view, I proposed, the meaning of a 'natural kind term' such as the word 'gold' is partly fixed by the division of linguistic labor

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[1] John Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p.198.
[2] Hilary Putnam, "Meaning and Reference", in *Meaning*, edited by Mark. Richard, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, p.70.

and partly by what I was later to call the shared 'stereotype'.[3] Putnam especially picks up this issue for rejecting the description theory. He argues that not only a *reference fixing* but *reference borrowing* has an important role to play in the context of the definition of a natural kind term. In his famous article "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", Putnam is speaking about two presuppositions which traditional theories of meaning accept. Actually Putnam challenges these presuppositions:

a) Knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state.

b) The meaning of a term determines its extension.

Putnam wants to clarify that we cannot admit these presuppositions together and we should drop one of them. It is quite true that we cannot relinquish the second presupposition as it will be a refutation of our theory of meaning. Here it is important to mention that if we are able to admit mental states, we need to state their identity conditions. For this we need to mention their identity conditions through their content. For instance,

Tom believes that Lord Rama is an avatar.

Jerry believes that Lord Krishna is an avatar.

We find a difference between their beliefs because the contents of their beliefs are different. A narrow content is a content of a particular belief which is determined by the individual's internal mental properties. An internal property is a property that does not depend at all on the individual's environment. Internalists and descriptivists are the supporters of this view.

There are two types of mental contents which we find in philosophy of mind. A wide or broad content is a content of a particular belief which is not determined by the individual's intrinsic properties. Actually it is determined by individual's relation to his/her environment. Externalists are the supporters of this view. Narrow content on the other hand is determined exclusively by the intrinsic properties of the individual. Besides, internalists who accepted the propositional contents as narrow argues that the propositional contents could suitably supervene

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[3] Hilary Putnam, *My Intellectual Autobiography*, forthcoming in *The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam*, Library of Living Philosopher series, Illinois: Open court, 2015. I am personally indebted to him for sending me this unpublished work in 2010.

on psychological properties or internal features of an agent. For them, the reference of a natural kind term can be determined by internal properties that could be well suited with descriptive properties of an agent.

Putnam's 'Twin Earth Thought Experiment' claims that I and my *doppelganger* (molecule for molecule identical twin) do share a same psychological state about 'water' and 'twater' as tasteless, colorless, liquid etc. But the case is that in my 'earth' water is identified as H_2O but my in 'doppelganger earth' or 'twin earth' water is identified as XYZ. In such a situation both of us have no knowledge about the fact we were referring to two different objects by using the same term 'water'. So its follow from this experiment that in spite of being in the same psychological state (narrow content) I and my doppelganger used the innocent term 'water' which actually meant two different objects. And a change in their meaning leads to a consequent change in their extension and even also a change in their mental state. So Putnam concludes that 'Cut the pie any way you like, 'meanings' just ain't in the head!'[4]

Even in the case of 'elm' and 'beech', it is too difficult for a speaker to make a distinction between them. Therefore, we need a 'division of linguistic of labor'; there the experts will guide us about the exact meaning of a reference term. The main point I would like to focus is that what makes Externalism attractive or what is the important of semantic externalism today? It seems to me that the most attractive part of semantic externalism is that a naturalistic outlook towards human beings in the world. Another part is that to challenge the view of incorrigibility or intrinsic ability that tries to see the whole debate from the skin in. Semantic externalism vindicates that the concepts that are important for our knowledge become meaningless if and only if it has no causal connection with the referent or external world. Putnam thinks that "To have concepts it is necessary to have appropriate causal connection with an environment. Semantic externalism implies externalism about the mind; if to have a mind is to have thoughts, then to have a mind, it isn't sufficient to have the right goings-on in the brain and the rest of the body; to have a mind you have to be hooked up to an environment in the proper way, or at least

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[4] Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", *Mind, Language, and Reality, Philosophical Papers*, vol-2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p.227.

to have a mind that can think about an external world, you have to casual interactions that extend into the environment."[5]

Major Research Concerns:

My intention here is to show that what the main arguments of Internalists are and how they defend their own thesis. Later I will mention the current responses of Externalists against Internalists charges.

Searle's defense of internalism:

John Searle in his book *Intentionality: An Essay in Philosophy of Mind* [6] argues for 'meanings are in the head thesis'. He considers that the fundamental question of philosophy is 'how does language relate to reality?' But his main intention was to show from Fregean accounts that how expressions and objects are related in an individual mind. In favor of internalist account he argues as follows:

Self referentiality: Searle claims that if a person saw his/her hand in front of his/her face then the condition of his/her indexical proposition would be self-referential.

Non- indexical descriptive content: Searle believes that self-referentiality is also related with the idea of lexical meaning or non-indexical descriptive content. Actually there are four types of non-indexical expressions we will find in our language: Time (now, later, yesterday, etc.), Place (here, there etc.), Utterance directionality ('I' refers to the person uttering), Discoursal relations (the former, the later).

Now we can summarize Searle's thinking in the following way:

a) Meanings are actually in the head of the speaker which is also a part of mental makeup of language user.

b) The linguistic utterances are intentional in nature. Intention set certain conditions which determine extension.

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[5] Hilary Putnam, 'Sixty five years of philosophy: A Participant's Thoughts and Experiences', He lectured this paper in East Anglia University. Personally I am thankful to him for sending me the lecture paper.
[6] John Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

c) Meanings do not depend upon external, causal and contextual determinations. Mental contents like belief, desire do not depend on external world.

Fodor's arguments:

For Fodor, we have to identify mental content in terms of narrow content to respect supervenience theory and in this aspect the externalist theory about broad content is wrong. Here it is relevant to mention that how Fodor has changed his mind and has became the supporter of externalism.[7] Supervenience theory claims that no change in supervenient property without a change in subvenient property or it will be better to say that no psychological change will be occurred without a physical change. The twins, under the externalist assumption have identical physical properties but have distinct mental states (as their broad contents are distinct).

There is also a conceptual connection we will find between the twins and also in their thought. For Fodor, 'It is conceptually necessary that if you are connected to water in the right way then you have water thoughts (rather than twater thought) and it is again conceptually necessary that if you are connected to twater in the right way then you have twater thoughts (rather than water thoughts).'[8]

Two Strong Charges against Externalism:

Here I would like to focus on the two strong charges of internalism against externalism.

A. Empty Natural Kind Term and Externalism:

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[7] In a private communication my mentor Hilary Putnam told me that "Externalists do not claim that every singular term has its meaning determined by causal connection. In "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" I restricted the claim that meaning is *partly* determined by extension to natural kind words, and possibly certain other nouns, and a term with an empty extension cannot be a natural kind word, although speakers may mistakenly believe that it is.. Even Fodor, who is a strong externalist for some decades now, thinks that logical words (*and*, *or*, *not*, *if-then*, etc.) have their meaning determined by their conceptual roles, not externalistically." Personally I am thankful to him for this suggestion.

[8] Jerry Fodor, "A Modal Argument for Narrow Content", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 88, No.1. 1991, p.20-21.

According to the externalists natural kind terms are fundamentally relational. The internalists, mainly Segal, claim that "This most courageous of externalists view is catastrophic. There are numerous empty kind terms that we must take to express concepts."[9] We can have considerable ideas regarding some empty terms like "quark", "ghost" etc.

We can say that this argument is much more metaphysical rather than epistemic or semantical. But the problem for the externalists is that they cannot accept the non-referring tokens of water. The externalists responded that the concepts are satisfied by some context independent conditions. Now what will be the satisfactory conditions of water in *Dry Earth*? The extension of water in dry earth is not found. Boghossian thinks that in the case of 'water' in *Dry Earth* we will not find the relevant causal chain of the referent natural kind term 'water', so there is no fact of the matter that can claim about what proposition is conveyed by the sentences that involving with it.

B. First person authority and self-knowledge:

One learns the meaning of 'I think' not by teaching of others but by thinking oneself in a linguistic community as grown up people do. So externalists need to accept the concept of first-person experience. By this argument Dretske tried to show the importance of internal states and the first person authority in the field of externalism. Self-knowledge is the knowledge we each enjoy of our own mental states as opposed to the knowledge we purport to have of the external world. This thesis also goes under the name 'privileged access' and we shall use both interchangeably.

Two alternative characters are interconnecting with the concept of self-knowledge:

   a) *Authoritative*:

If one claims that she is in a certain mental state, then the sentence will be a prima facie case only if she would fail to guarantee the truth of her *self-ascription.* So here sincerity and competence will be the primary conditions to become a self-knowledge.

   b) *Non-inferentiality*:

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[9] Gabriel Segal, *A Slim Book of Narrow Content*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000, p.33.

An avowal and a first person authority are not related with the concept of non-inferentiality. If I claim that "I have a throat pain", then there is no conception of inferentiality in my side. But in the case of second and third person, if I told them that "I have a throat pain", then they have no other way to know without inferring to know my mental attitudes. Internalists claim that externalism is incompatible with self-knowledge.

Externalist responses:

Davidson tries to show in his "Knowing One's Own Mind" that Externalism may well be consistent with the claim of first person authority. He wants to point out that something which is external to the subject (or part of his physical or social environment) may well be intrinsic to it in the sense that mental states may well be individuated in terms of it. He comes up with his famous sunburn example. Suppose a person has a skin condition which is identified by the doctor as sunburn. Here, though the sun is external to the patient it is in terms of the sun that something which is internal to him, i.e. his skin condition is identified. Similarly broad relational content of thought is external to the subject, yet it is individualized.

Davidson and *Swampman* are synchronic, physical and behavioral duplicates. Before we go further let me remind that Davidson holds a historical causal theory of representational content according to which we cannot separate the idea of past causal interaction with external affairs in our constitutive meaningful use of language. He modifies the Wittgensteinan representational thesis to add that content is individuated with causal and historical environment. Through this thesis Davidson claims that *Swampman* has not any capacity of intentional thought. Even he also claims that it has not learned the meaning of any term in our learning situation. The reason is that *Swampman* has no teleological function in his brain, so the utterance of his words has no reference. We know that one can recognize someone only if he/she had encountered with him/her before, but in the case of *Swampman* there is no question of meeting with all the friends of Davidson before. Even *Swampman* is not able to speak a public language as he had never passed through our learning processes.

In his latest writing *Origins of Objectivity*[10], Tyler Burge claims that the question is not that beliefs are not in the head or they are constituted by external objects but the claim is more commonsensical which talks about the location of beliefs contents. He adds a new idea that beliefs states are located where the believers are located. Now he believes in a crucial relation between belief content and the believers in the sense that social linguistic practices alone embed these belief contents. In the case of arthritis argument, Burge argues that only through our socio-linguistic practice we can determine whether one has arthritis in the thigh or in the joints. Social externalism entails generally the existence of other people and their linguistic practices bringing the contents of thoughts. So, it seems to follow that if we know a priori the contents of our own thoughts, we must know a priori that there are social and linguistic practices and other people. Burge refutes this argument by arguing that one may know something without knowing the "background enabling conditions" that make that knowledge possible. For example, your knowledge of your thought that water is a liquid does not require knowledge of the conditions that make the thought possible. For example, the existence of water (H_2O). Timothy Williamson has argued in his 2004 *Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society*, that the use of thought experiments need not involve any a priori intuition, but only 'Our general cognitive capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals, which is not exclusively a priori...'[11]

Orthodox externalism does not admit self-knowledge for the reason that it will lead to inconsistency. That is why externalism bifurcate the content into narrow or wide content. However, Bilgrami rules out this bifurcation of content. He writes that 'My constraint on externalism sees to it that external items which determine concepts do not determine concepts that are as such odds with his other beliefs that he will fall into the situation of uttering or thinking inconsistent thoughts just on the basis of the concepts attributed to him. Agents, on my view, may think thoughts that we specify as 'Water is not H_2O' or 'I have arthritis in my thigh' but the concepts of water or arthritis in these cases will not be determined by the expert's beliefs or by scientific essence etc.'[12] Bilgrami offers a unified content theory which neither makes

[10] Tyler Burge, *Origins of Objectivity,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
[11] T. Williamson, "Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*: 105, 2004, p.1.

[12] Akeel Bilgrami, *Belief and Meaning*: *The Unity and Locality of Mental Content,* Oxford, and New York: Blackwell, 1992, p.55.

room for narrow content nor for wide content. For it there is a unity of both contents in our beliefs. So it is easy for his constraint theory to show that social external items are capable to enter in to content routed through the agent beliefs. Even in the alternative position where external items lacks some social contents, there Bilgrami's constraint thesis clarifies it's linguistical specification through eliminating this issues into an ordinary belief like, 'water is the substance that comes out of the tap' thus he removed his constraint theory from the threaten of self-knowledge where social and non-social external elements are unified with agent beliefs.

Major Research questions

I would like to mention here some major research questions which we can derive from the thesis.

First, *Action explanation*: We can ascribe mental states or propositional attitudes to people in order to rationalize their action or behavior. Some philosophers consider that here the intrinsic content can be determined by external behavior. So the question I will address is whether broad or narrow individuation of mental content will explain action in the way that is needed by a theory of action explanation.

Secondly, *First person authority*: Does externalism lead to a claim that a person may not have first person authority over his or her own mental states?

Thirdly, *Mind-world relation*: This is my main concern. As we know that in this debate Intentionality has taken an important role. Most of the philosophers (externalist) try to consider how intentionality is submerged in to world though there are some philosophers whom we called internalist think that world is submerged in to intentionality. I would like to enquire which one of these alternatives is right.

Fourthly, How can we derive the indeterminacy of meaning principle? Is it a sort of 'meaning nihilism'? Can we construe a meaning theory that can able to goes beyond internalism /externalism debate?

Fifthly, If we accept the *productivity of language* as mentioned by Chomsky and Fodor as true then how can a new sentence effect on the network and the holist framework of meaning? Is it

true that a new sentence can make a massive change in the network of the observational sentences? What is the process of language learning? If we accept meaning holism is true, then can we claim that language learners learn a language part by part or gradually? It seems to me that every sentence has its own semantic import and we should understand this semantic import in terms of separate semantic content that is dependent to the entire language.

Sixthly, Reconciliation of the debate: Can we make a reconciliation of the debate (Internalism – Externalism) from the perspective of phenomenology or especially from Heideggerian approach of 'Dasein'?

Implication and my concerns:

Here my intention is to reconcile the main debate between internalism verses externalism and also reformulate the relationship between mind and meaning from the perspectives of semantics, Ethics, Epistemology and Phenomenology. If we accept reformed externalism which I call "Internalistic-Externalism" then it will be easy to solve these problems related to the inner-outer divide. The "Internalistic-Externalism" accepts that there are some concepts which are intrinsic in the sense that they are not dependent on second or third person experience. Here the first person or agent is authoritative and the subject has immediate access to these contents. This conception of authoritative self- knowledge may lead to the admission of a kind of private language, but like Wittgenstein I also do not support any kind of private language or solipsism. I, therefore, believe that the intrinsic experiences get their meaning when they are used in public language and even we can think about them also through natural language. So the incorrigible private experiences find their external expression when we try to see their meaning from our publicly sharable language viz., natural language. So it can be easily said that mental contents are not in the mind (they are external) but we can call still them intrinsic in some cases as the agents are the best authority and have immediate access of the concepts, like "I am feeling hungry".

It seems to me that we can find a difference between Bilgrami's new theory of externalism and my "Internalistic-Externalism". Bilgrami considers that contents are not determined in a causal way but every determination of contents is public. I agreed with him only if he uses the term *necessarily* in his thesis. It seems to me that it is true that it is not necessary

that all the determinations of our content will be causal. For instance, "I am personally influenced by Bilgrami's thought", here there is no causal relation. I am not causally influenced by Bilgrami's thoughts, rather normatively influenced by him. But I do not agree with him when he says that there is no exact way through which we can establish the causal relation between the concepts of the agent and the objects in the world. For Bilgrami, there is no direct way of fastening on the external determinants of concepts. It seems to me that though there are causal constraints on the reference yet that does not mean that reference can be reduced to causality. Bilgrami commits this mistake.

The central point of Bilgrami's holism is that two agents can share their concepts in a particular locality but it may be possible that they did not share any concept at the meaning-theoretical level. Bilgrami considers that though X and Y both utter the same sentence that 'water will quench thirst' but it does not prove that they have the same content. The same sentence 'water will quench thirst' may have different literal meaning or expresses a different belief in each speaker's idiolects. If one of them says that the substance that they wish to drink will not poison them and the other agrees, then that belief may be counted as relevant to this local concept 'water' which goes into the explanation of their actions. If one of them says that the substance has the chemical composition and the other is puzzled by that, count that belief as irrelevant in this locality. So we need to make a distinction between speaker's linguistic expressions and the contents of the expressions. This is a very controversial issue that I will discuss in detail in my thesis in future.

Now I will clarify more elaborately and technically what are the main achievements in my reformed externalism.

First, semantic holism which naturally fits with semantic externalism is mainly concerning how beliefs states are dependent on each other for having their contents fixed. In Quine's dictum: meaning of a sentence is dependent on the corporate body of the sentences. Quine holds that our learning of language starts with sentences that are directly associated with the external stimuli, so any semantic change which occurs in any part of the system consequently affects a large part of the network. Now the question is that are the contributions of theoretical sentences dependent on the contribution of other sentences? As I understood the thesis, if a sentence can causally and referentially (not inferentially) be related with other sentences or

external world, then we can know its meaning. My query is that when an agent knew a sentence, then it is not possible for him to know the whole meaning of this sentence at a time. Though I agree with Quine that our statement face the tribunal of sense experience only as a corporate body, yet it seems to me that it is impossible for a learner to grasp the total related body of sentences. The reason is that in this case a learner tries to grasp the sentences which are much more relevant to know the expression (which he/she wants to know) not the whole scheme. For me, it is a reliable process of a speaker to know partially the knowledge of the meaning of an expression and later the learning process of the knowledge can be gradually increased.

Quine actually denied any kind of analyticity as he considered that the division between analytic and synthetic is unintelligible. We can also derive analyticity from "cognitive synonymy"; this synonymy can be defined in terms of interchangeability. This is the point where I don't agree with semantic holism or especially with Quine. For me semantic holism can be mingled with analyticity. In my reformed externalism I try to show that in hypothetical formalized language we can say that analytic proposition can be immune from revision as the speaker can express his/her logical thought in a formalized language. But in our natural language, there are some 'one-criterion' words or *law-cluster* concepts which are accepted as true. For instance, 'vixen' and 'bachelor' etc. There is no question of its general acceptance. But I agree with Putnam that there is a limited notion of analyticity which applies to such a trivial cases as "all bachelors are unmarried" and that it is philosophically unimportant but an important notion of analyticity depends on the 'necessity of revisable' and 'conceptual truth'. This is the point at which my reformed externalism comes into its own character as it purports to explain apriority and analyticity along with externalism. As we know that necessity and apriority are the main criteria of analytic propositions. It also seems to me that reflection, understanding and calculation provide us with non-empirical knowledge or *aprori* knowledge. Cassam requests us to imagine a flag in which the left half is red and the right half is green. Now can we imagine a circumstance in which something can be red all over or green all over at a same time? The answer will be we cannot apply such a thing. But here this knowledge is not dependent upon experience, it arises from our understanding which is related with our intuitive insight. Reasoning is another case with which we can associate the idea of an *a priori* knowledge. Let us remember that Honorable Pranab Mukherjee is the present President of India and the President of India lives in Delhi. Now by reasoning I come to know that Pranab Mukherjee lives in Delhi. So

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we find that in the case of this knowledge it is not that meaning is always external or meaning is only in the mind. I consider that we need to see holism as a thesis where meaning is referentially attached with reality but intrinsically dependent on agent's mind. So we find that semantic holism can be compatible with analyticity; similarly internalism and externalism can be reconciled.

Secondly, my "Internalistic-Externalism" paves the way for the 'semantic' to enter into phenomenology or 'ontology'. In my last chapter, I will discuss Heidegger's concept of *Dasein* or "Being-in-the-world". I think that the debate between internalism and externalism is not only a semantic problem; we can put forward it in ontological field. The conception of the self and world and their interrelationship is a common matter in 'ontology'. Heidegger explicates the idea of "world hood of the world" in terms of "Being-in-the-world". In the expression "Being-in-the-world", here the term "in" has a surplus significance. It refers to the spatial dimension of world. We cannot separate 'I' from this contemporary world. Heidegger's unique contribution in this field consists in using a method, which he called "Hermeneutic phenomenology". Hermeneutic phenomenology is a kind of method by which Being perceives the world from an intellectual point of view. Here the term 'phenomenology' expresses a maxim, which takes us back 'To the things themselves'. Mary Warnock explains this method in *Existentialism* as follows: 'The phenomenological method is said to be 'hermeneutical' just because it does reveal significance. The world is thought of as a code or set of symbols and the purpose of the phenomenological method is to interpret it.'[13] Heidegger explicitly stressed that it can be seen phenomenalogically that self and the world in the structure of Being itself. *Dasein* constantly enters into all kinds of association with others. Therefore Heidegger emphasizes the question of *being-with. Dasein* cannot be an isolated being because we cannot imagine *Dasein* as a wordless subject. *Dasein* exists essentially for the sake of others men.

Similarly the mind and language both are world directed and we cannot separate mental content from the physical world as mental content got its meaning through shareable language in our community. It also seems to me that in the case of non-existence terms like 'unicorn' there will be no problem for my reformed externalism as I believe that reference has two parts, *Direct*

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[13] Mary Warnock, *Existentialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 54.

Reference and *Indirect Reference.* In the case of natural kind term or it would be better to say referential term like water, cat, house etc., we are interconnected with the perceived object directly. In the case of 'unicorn' (a non-referring term), if we analyze the concept unicorn, then we will find that one can divide it through its mere description like 'a winged horse that can fly' etc. If we divide this term by description then we find obviously some external objects which were related with the term referentially like 'wing' and 'horse' etc. So it is plausible to claim that it is always possible to interconnect mind and world through language. Here the reference of a term is indirectly determined by its description.

Though values are essentially connected with agent's thought, yet the concept of universality in this sense transfer moral value in the realm of objectivity. Even the moral properties like rightness, wrongness is quite objective like secondary qualities in a liberal sense. A thing being red has the property of looking red, similarly an action being wrong has the property of not to be dullness. These properties of redness and not to be dullness are not only an objective mode, but it is intrinsic in the sense of color and value. My attempt is to show that values are neither objective nor intrinsically subjective as it is related to the will of the subject. For me values are beyond something subject-object dichotomy, values are conceptually inter-subjective, where subjective and objective sense of value mingles together. So we cannot separate morale values as subjective as it is causally and also referentially interconnected with external world. Similarly mind and world cannot be separated.

My "Internalistic-Externalism" considers that the meaning of our belief-content has played two different roles at a same time. One is its '*meaning theoretical'* role and the other is its role as the context determined by society or environment, the later I call '*socio*-environmental meaning'. The '*meaning theoretical*' role has much more do with our mind, as the internalists point out, whereas '*socio-environmental meaning*' depends on its linguistic community as mentioned by Putnam and Burge. In meaning theoretical stage an individual can think about any term or concept on his/her own choice. Even he/she can break the norms of the linguistic society to which he/she is belongs. He/she can think his/her pet dog as his/her son or their pet parrot as their daughter. It is possible in our own mind where mind is the king. However, we cannot see the case so easily from the background of "socio-environmental meaning" because here the norms of the society tell us that biologically dog cannot be a son or parrot cannot be a daughter

of a human being. Here we need to follow the rules of the society to continue our communication which is the ultimate goal of language. But I disagree with them if they claim that there is no conception of 'individualistic mind' or meanings are not in the 'individual's head'. Of course there are individual mind, but these do not work privately; they participate in our natural language. Because natural language is the ground on which others mind meet. There is no mind in our linguistic community which can be separated from the environment therefore I believe that meaning is not something which is only external; meanings are became meaning of the presence of mind. So mind and meaning are embedded in the world in a symmetrical way. Even the beliefs, desires, pain and other mental items are dependent on mind in the same way they are dependent on the world. So in short my "Internalistic-Externalism" brings the harmony between world and mind through the concept of meaning.

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